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Chapter II
The question of self-creation
I would like to take into consideration in this chapter the 
possibility of Richard Rorty's evolution of views in terms of -  
suggested by him -  distinction between the private and the public 
as well as in terms of his dichotomous pair of "solidarity" and "self­
creation". My efforts would aim at showing that Rorty as a 
commentator on other philosophers is more and more inclined to 
value the significance of a self-creational, developing one's "final 
vocabulary" way of philosophizing, while on the other hand -  as a 
philosopher himself he has remained as far as the private sphere 
goes -  in his own philosophizing -  rather moderate and full of 
reserve. Thus I would like to trace two roles possible in a 
philosophical language game -  to have a look at Rorty’s account 
of particular philosophers as heroes of the philosophical tradition 
and to have a look at Rorty himself in the role of a philosopher in 
a traditional sense of the term, that is to say, interested in the 
so-called "philosophical problems, "eternal, perennial problems of 
philosophy", generally -  a language game of Philosophy with a 
capital "p” (to use the opposition between "post-Philosophical 
ph ilo sophy" and "P h ilosophy" from  Consequences of 
Pragmatism).
First, we would have to outline briefly the Rortyan sense of 
particular elements of the aforementioned dichotomies, explain a 
little the concepts from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that 
interest us in this chapter. Let us begin by saying that Rorty -  
distinguishing between writers of self-creation (such as 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger or Nabokov) on the one hand 
and writers of solidarity (such as Marx, Mill, Habermas or Rawls) 
on the other -  advises us not to attempt to make choices between 
the two kinds, not to oppose the two camps and rather, as he puts 
it, to "give them equal weigh and then use them for different 
purposes".1 For there is no way to bring together self-creation and *
1 Richard Rorty, C, p. xiv.
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solidarity on the level of theory, there is no such a philosophical 
perspective which would allow to have private perfection and 
solidarity or justice in one single comprehensive view (a private 
vocabulary of self-creation and a public vocabulary of solidarity 
are two incommensurable universes, devoid of common reference 
and shared language). Besides, there is no common purpose: for 
self-creation it is perfecting one’s self so as to avoid giving the 
possibility of being described in someone else’s-ra ther than one’s 
own -  "final vocabulary", for solidarity it is the end of humiliation, 
minimization of cruelty, lessening of pain. Rorty’s assumption is 
that human solidarity increases when it refers not to an abstract 
account of the "humanity" in general but to "one of us", where "us" 
means "something smaller and more local than the human race".2 
Moral progress is the progress to greater solidarity seen as an 
ability to view traditional differences (of race, religion, customs) as 
insignificant when compared with similarities as to pain and 
humiliation. The Rortyan solidarity (different from identification 
with "the humanity as such") appears as a characteristic trait of 
the first epoch in human history in which, as he puts it
large numbers of people have become able to separate 
the question "Do you believe and desire what we believe 
and desire?" from the question "Are you suffering?". In 
my jargon, this is the ability to distinguish the question 
whether you and I share the same final vocabulary from 
the question whether you are in pain. Distinguishing 
these questions makes it possible to distinguish public 
from private questions, questions about pain from 
questions about the point of human life, the domain of 
the liberal from the domain of the ironist. It thus makes it 
possible for a single person to be both.3
2 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 191.
3 Ibidem, p. 198. Zygmunt Bauman asks in this context about the amount 
of this "large numbers of people" stressing at the same time the significance of 
the above distinction for the fate of the so understood (postmodern) solidarity. 
See my "philosophical excursus" on Rorty and Bauman for more details. See 
also Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 
XXI.
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Let us take as a point of our departure here the fact that in his 
text entitled "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity" (1984) 
Rorty unmistakably criticizes Foucault for his writing, as he puts it, 
"from a point of view light-years away from the problems of 
contemporary society", for his being "a dispassionate observer" of 
the present social order and finally for the lack of "the rhetoric of 
emancipation" in his work.4 Besides, his w ork shows 
"extraordinary dryness", "remoteness", or to put it in a nutshell: the 
communal "we" is absent from his work. He adopts a similar tone 
in a criticism of Jean-François Lyotard when he discusses a 
controversy (from the beginning of the so-called "postmodern 
debate") between Habermas and his French antagonist. Rorty 
says the following:
Anything that Habermas will count as retaining a 
"theoretical approach" will be counted by incredulous 
Lyotard as a "metanarrative". Anything that abandons 
such an approach will be counted by Habermas as more 
or less irrational because it drops the notions which have 
been used to justify the various reforms which have 
marked the history of the Western democracies since the 
Enlightenment and which are still being used to criticize 
the socio-economic institutions of both Free and the 
Communist worlds. Abandoning a standpoint which is, if 
not transcendental, at least "universalistic", seems to 
Habermas to betray the social hopes which have been 
central to liberal politics.5
Thus what is at stake here is differences of utmost importance 
to both philosophers -  it is "private irony and liberal hope" (to use 
the title of one of chapters of Rorty’s book on contingency). 
Habermas in this controversy represents an option oriented to a 
"social hope", requiring from the philosopher efforts in favor of the 
progress of the "human spirit in history". Lyotard, incredulous to 
global projects, social-oriented "great narratives", favors
4 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 173.
Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 165.5
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micronarratives, micrologies, whose aim is to show tiny "injustices" 
(or "wrongs") within existing social patterns and to advise, to coin 
a new idiom to try to express them. Habermas’ project appears 
today as perhaps more radical but less effective, while Lyotard’s 
proposals -  although in the sphere of declarations obviously less 
"committed" -  in the long run may open possibilities of greater 
transformations in the symbolic world than could be expected.
Rorty in his text does not seem to see in Lyotard one particular 
trait and this is the aspect of his criticism we want to draw attention 
to in his evolution we are interested -  namely, that seeking the 
sublime in Lyotard’s conception of the aesthetic of the sublime is, 
despite appearances, not free from social or ethical references, it 
is not separated from a "solidarity"-related side of human behavior. 
Rorty thinks that the need of the ineffable, the need of the sublime, 
the desire to transgress the restrictions imposed, never coincide 
with social needs: "[Ojne should not see the intellectual as serving 
a social purpose when she fulfils this need"6 In Lyotard, as is well 
known, it is not accidental that the aesthetics of the "sublime" is 
synonymous with the aesthetics of "resistance" -  and although at 
stake is not a social resistance, some common movement of social 
disobedience, the essential trait of his aesthetics is cultural 
resistance, a protest against the power of the capital and 
omnipotence of the (Horkheimer-Adorno’s) instrumental reason, 
a degenerated form of the Kantian theoretical reason.7 The 
aesthetical and the social (or specifically "political" in the 
Lyotardian sense of the term) themes form a mixture from which 
one cannot separate merely "eastheticizing" thought and the 
"political", ideological one, oriented to current needs of politics. 
Lyotard’s answer to Habermas’ objection lies in "little narratives", 
in (potentially) critically powerful counter-narratives which apart 
from politics and aesthetics, manifest themselves in cognitive and 
practical spheres.
6 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 176.
7 See e.g. Lyotard’s "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde" or "Philosophy and 
Painting in the Age of Their Experimentation: Contribution to an Idea of 
Postmodernity", in The Lyotard Reader, ed. A. Benjamin (Oxford: Blackwell), 
1989, pp. 181-212
Rorty clearly separates both motivations of human activities 
(the one of self-creation, the other of solidarity) and locates Lyotard 
unhesitatingly among philosophers of self-creation, at least as far 
as the issue of the sublime is concerned: Habermas is the 
philosopher of solidarity, Lyotard who looks for "sublime ways of 
disengaging from the interests of others", is a philosopher of 
solidarity. Such a radical dichotomization of attitudes works 
perfectly well in the case of Jacques Derrida from The Postcard, 
but it does not seem to be accurate and applicable in the case of 
Lyotard. His aesthetics of the sublime is not a "privatized" version 
of current philosophy, nor is it away from problems of 
contemporary society -  for in the very idea of "incredulity towards 
(all) metanarratives" as well as in the opposition between 
metanarratives and narratives, there is a peculiarly subversive 
point, unnoticed or omitted as insignificant by Rorty.
This is what Rorty says in the times when his figure of an 
"ironist" has not been crystallized yet. It can be easily seen how 
far in the author's philosophical thinking the public sphere, the 
domain of solidarity dominated then and it was just this domain 
that determined the estimation of the contemporary French 
philosophy which Rorty did not want to have much in common with 
(it can also be seen not less clearly from his polemics with Lyotard 
in "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation" where he accuses 
French philosophers of and worries about their “antiutopianism, 
their apparent loss of faith in liberal democracy"8). The private, 
self-creation and self-invention, seems unable to find its way to 
Rorty's philosophical constellation of the middle of the eighties, 
though, let us add, formally both spheres were not isolated and 
opposed to each other in his discourse yet.
The author's change in attitude towards self-creational 
philosophizing and generally towards the private sphere in 
philosophy is brought about, just to give one example, with the text 
"Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of Foucault". It is 
here that Foucault becomes a sole object of interest but it happens 
this time that his philosophizing did have its value and significance, 
it would be great if it were not for one detail, extremely important:
90 The question of self-creation
8 Richard Rorty, PP 1, p. 220.
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separation of the two spheres (called there the sphere of moral 
identity and of private autonomy) on which Foucault's stubborn 
thought swept, separation -  distinct, performed by the author 
himself -  of his two roles, indication of dissimilarity and 
separateness of the two language games. Thus Foucault would 
be entitled to self-create his personality, to develop his "final 
vocabulary" -  and no longer would it be an accusation -  if he were 
more willing to separate his moral identity (as a citizen) from his 
(private) search for autonomy. Rorty says there the following:
I think Foucault should have answered the questions 
"Where do you stand?, What are your values?" in this 
way: "I stand with you as a fellow-citizen, but as a 
philosopher, I stand off by myself, pursuing projects of 
self-invention which are none of your concern. I am not 
about to offer philosophical grounds for being on your 
side in public affairs, for my philosophical project is a 
private one which provides neither motive nor 
justification for my political actions.9
Thus, in this text two equally justified spheres appeared, two 
potential references of the philosophical discourse, two - 
incompatible with each other -  parts of the human self: the private 
and the public. Let us add here that Foucault was for Rorty of that 
time a convenient example, since his work unmistakably touched 
upon public matters, although put them in unknown previously 
light. So some equilibrium between (already separated) public and 
privatized philosophy, between its self-creational and solidarity 
motifs, is maintained. Let us notice that the most fascinating texts 
devoted to Derrida -  with the exception of one of the most 
interesting essays he ever devoted to him, "Philosophy as a Kind 
of Writing" (1979) -  were written towards the end of the eighties, 
just then (1989) there appeared also his Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity. It seems that Derrida must have waited -  to become 
Rorty's leading example of ironist philosophizing, the one devoid 
of "liberal hope" and focused upon self-creation -  until Rorty
9 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 198.
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himself exposes one element out of the two remaining in balance. 
This element became the private, as it is easy to predict.
Analyzing late Derrida‘s writings, especially The Postcard, in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty unambiguously accepts 
the non-public kind of philosophy. He compares the role Derrida 
plays in philosophy with the one Proust did in the domain of 
literature -  they both mark the new horizon, require new criteria to 
evaluate their work and to categorize them in a given genre 
(philosophy and literature, respectively). They extend the bounds 
of possibility. Rorty says, for example:
I take Derrida's importance to lie in his having had the 
courage to give up the attempt to unite the private and 
the public, to stop trying to bring together a quest for 
private autonomy and an attempt at public resonance 
and utility.10 1
Derrida in Rorty's account does not want to participate in such 
language game which does not draw a distinction between 
"phantasy and argument, philosophy and literature, serious writing 
and playful writing" -  but first and foremost Derrida is not willing 
to write according to the rules of someone else's "final vocabulary". 
Let us pay some attention to the degree of overt admiration 
contained in Rorty's (summing-up, anyway) sentence about 
Derrida in which he says that Derrida "has written a kind of book 
which nobody had ever thought of before".11 Finally, it is not 
accidentally that Derrida's work in philosophy is compared with 
Marcel Proust's work that puts an end to the great tradition of the 
French prose from Montaigne on the one hand, and opens new 
horizons for the novels of the twentieth century on the other.
Rorty’s figure of the "ironist" helps him to counter-balance first 
and then to overbalance one of the elements of the distinction. The 
"ironist" as a cultural hero meets three conditions: first, he must 
have constant doubts as to his (current) final vocabulary because 
he is influenced by people he meets and books he reads. Second,
10 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 125.
11 Ibidem, p. 137 - emphasis mine.
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he must be aware that the above doubts cannot be got rid off, and 
third, he cannot think that his final vocabulary is somehow "closer" 
to the reality than all other vocabularies. If his self is contingent, 
so also his final vocabulary is changeable and unstable12.
Although Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for the most part is 
devoted to a "liberal" ironist and to liberal utopia, it is pervaded with 
worship and admiration of a "non-liberal" ironist -  of Derrida. (It 
might be worth-while to notice that Rorty's attitude towards 
Habermas -  who being a "liberal", is not an "ironist" -  is quite 
different; at least this asymmetry indicates how important irony is: 
you can forgive the lack of liberalism (with irony present), but it is 
more difficult to be the case with the lack of irony (with liberalism 
present).
It seems to me -  though I must admit that this feeling may be 
not satisfactorily grounded -  that what pervades Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity is a sort of tension, perhaps connected in 
Rorty's case with his still traditional -  at least with reference to 
himself -  account of the role of the philosopher and of philosophy, 
as well as with the acceptance of the still classical model of the 
intellectual. This tension is born between an enthusiastic 
acceptance of a non-public (and obviously non-liberal), just 
privatized form of a philosophical discourse, exemplified by 
Derrida's writing -  and still very concrete projects of "liberal 
utopia", a constant care of those "details of pain", of "humiliation", 
"cruelty", present almost everywhere in this book. In this tension 
(present also in texts from Philosophical Papers) there is -  in a 
more or less explicit version -  the question of a fundamental 
importance to every thinker: Who am I? what am I doing in culture
12 Let us add that Rorty, according to his conception of the contingent nature 
of human self and human personality, decidedly rejects the idea that -  for 
instance -  concentration camp guards from Auschwitz lacked some essentially 
human component, which may have caused their precisely non-human behavior, 
agreeing thereby with e.g. Zygmunt Bauman who (like Lyotard) traces the 
relations between modernity -  and the Holocaust rather than modernity -  and 
the "authoritarian personality", for instance. See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity 
and the Holocaust (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989) and Jean-François Lyotard, The 
Différend. Phrases in Dispute (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
pp. 86-127.
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today?, that is to say, the question about the philosopher’s identity. 
The tension is expressed in many parallel conceptual pairs and in 
various accounts: for instance, Rorty asks -  referring to Derrida -  
whether the latter is a "private writer" or "a writer with a public 
mission", whether he is a "writer" or a "philosopher", and with 
reference to Foucault he asks whether he is a "poet" (or a "knight 
of autonomy") or a "philosopher", engaging thereby in a 
controversy about the primacy of poetry or philosophy started 
already by Plato13. Finally, Rorty opposes the philosopher-"social 
engineer" and the philosopher-"poet" and seems to be equally 
attentive to both of them. It is possible to show in detail in which 
texts Rorty is closer to a (pragmatic) elevation of philosophy as a 
"prolongation of politics", and, on the other hand, in which he 
decidedly favors self-creational "recontextualizing one’s 
predecessors".14 At the same time one could show how far away 
Rorty was from French postmodern thought in the times when he 
criticized the Lyotardian conception of "the signs of history" 
(inspired by Kant) or his idea of "défaillanceof modernity"15, when 
French postmodernism was "irresponsible" and "revolutionary" -  
rather than reformist in the spirit of American pragmatism -  for 
him, and then when he gradually got closer to it until he accepted
13 See Richard Rorty, "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?'', "Texts 
and Lumps", in PP 2, or the text on Foucault from the same volume already 
referred to.
14 See, by way of example, "Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, as Politics" 
and "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity" on the one hand and the chapter 
on Derrida from CIS or "Texts and Lumps" from PP 1 on the other, where he says 
that "the pragmatist philosopher has a story to tell about his favorite, and least 
favored, books -  the texts of, for example, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Dewey, and Russell. He would like other people to have stories about other 
sequences of texts, other genres -  stories which will fit together with his" (p. 82) 
which, incidentally, immediately reminds of Lyotardian calls for us from 
Instructionspaiennesto "make micronarratives" and "tell stories"; See "Lessons 
in Paganism" in The Lyotard Reader.
15 See Jean-François Lyotard, "Universal History and Cultural Differences" 
and "The Sign of History” in The Lyotard Reader or The Différend. Phrases in 
Dispute. See also a chapter "The Sign of History" from my Polish book, Rorty 
and Lyotard. In the Labyrinths of Postmodernity
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the role of new alternatives, new "vocabularies" in transformations 
of ways we think.16
It might be thought of from a distance in the following way, for 
example: me, Richard Rorty, a neopragmatist and a liberal (the 
question arises whether "postmodern" in Lyotard’s sense of the 
word?), for some -  personal? cultural? institutional? or other? -  
reasons cannot let myself create such kind of philosophy that 
Derrida does. Me, Richard Rorty, cannot be "merely ironical" (i.e. 
I cannot merely "deprive us of certainty, disclosing the 
ambivalence of the world", as in Art of the Novel Milan Kundera 
said about the "irritating irony"), I can only be a liberal ironist, while 
what bears more significance to me out of this pair of terms is 
"liberalism" (and "solidarity", a chapter about which not 
accidentally closes the book). I admire though -  let us notice the 
power lying in the original title of the chapter, positive, as it is 
evident from its content: "From ironist theory to private jokes!" -  
Derrida’s consistency and persistence, and under the influence of 
the charm of philosophy of such a kind -  I acknowledge 
self-creational philosophizing to be absolutely equal, if not higher 
of the two, although to me, Richard Rorty, unfortunately 
inaccessible... Rorty seems to be fascinated with the poetical side 
of philosophy no less than with its conceptual, theoretical, 
argumentative one. In the already mentioned article about 
Foucault he says about him that he was a philosopher who claimed 
a poet’s privileges. "One of these privileges is to rejoin ’What has 
universal validity to do with me?’ I think -  he concludes -  that 
philosophers are as entitled to this privilege as poets, so I think 
this rejoinder sufficient".17 Rorty might have not expected that, in
16 So, to juxtapose quotations from Rorty which express two different 
thoughts put in the same philosophical categories: "This difference between 
wanting new vocabularies [i.e. the French -  MK] and wanting new arguments 
[i.e. the Anglo-Saxon -  MK] is closely connected with the difference between 
revolutionary and reformist politics" ("Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation", 
PP 1, p. 221, emphasis mine) versus - fo u r  years later, which is important for 
our purposes -  "the only thing that can displace an intellectual world is another 
intellectual world -  a new alternative, rather than an argument against an old 
alternative" ("Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?", PP 2, p. 121, emphasis 
mine).
17 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 198 -  emphasis mine.
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a couple of years, this unnoticed and underestimated Derrida 
would become his best example of a philosopher-poet. (Let us also 
remark how simple, assimilable, understandable Derrida is in 
Rorty's account, how good clues he provides to his riddles...) It is 
important to note here that irony not necessarily goes anti-liberal, 
it is rather so that ironist thinking -  according to Rorty from Hegel 
to Nietzsche to Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida -  is indifferent 
with respect to the public sphere, to the "public life and political 
questions".18 Ironist philosophers are invaluable when at stake is 
our private self-image, our self-creation, autonomy of thinking and 
sensibility, and they are useless as far as political, or in more 
general terms, public purposes are concerned. Irony becomes 
dangerous (because anti-liberal) only when an intellectual desires 
his own, private, self-creating self to serve as a model for others. 
For, as Rorty says elsewhere,
When he begins to think that other human beings have 
a moral duty to achieve the same inner autonomy as he 
himself has achieved, then he begins to think about 
political and social changes which will help them do so. 
Then he may begin to think that he has a moral duty to 
bring about these changes, whether his fellow citizens 
want them or not'9.
It should not be forgotten, though, that it was already in the 
second half of the seventies that Rorty touched upon the 
significance of Derrida's philosophizing, not using then, obviously, 
the distinctions drawn later on -  the private/the public and 
self-creation/solidarity. He thought of Derrida then as "a writer who 
is helping to see philosophy as a kind of writing rather than a 
domain of quasi-scientific inquiry".20 In this article there appeared 
rather the opposition of philosophy and literature, of a writer on the 
one, and a philosopher on the other hand, or -  quite shyly still -
18 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 83.
’9 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 194 -  emphasis mine.
20 Richard Rorty, "Derrida on Language, Being, and Abnormal Philosophy", 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXIV, No. II, p. 673.
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of "normal" and "abnormal" philosophy (the last qualification being 
devoid of any feeling of condemnation, disapproval or of only 
pejorative coloring). "Abnormal inquiry -  called ’revolutionary’ 
when it works and ’kooky’ when it does not -  requires only genius", 
the author says. The idea that the philosopher and philosophy as 
such are actually nothing unusual (what is the point of investigating 
what philosophy really is or who really deserves the name of 
philosopher), that philosophy may be merely (?) one of the 
possibilities given by writing, appeared for the first time in Rorty in 
a developed form in an essay "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing" 
(1979), published subsequently in Consequences of Pragmatism. 
It is there that Rorty notes that philosophy is not constituted by its 
eternal questions but rather by its specific traditions -  that of 
philosophers; that is, Father Parmenides, uncle Kant, little brother 
Derrida -  that philosophy is a "family romance", at least in its 
dialectical, non-Kantian, "Hegelian" version. Does Derrida want to 
comprehend Hegel’s books? No, he merely -  Rorty says -  "wants 
to play with Hegel. He doesn’t want to write a book about the nature 
of language; he wants to play with the texts which other people 
have thought they were writing about language"21 2 Is Derrida 
writing some philosophy? Does he put forward a coherent and 
comprehensible account of anything that was asked in the 
philosophical tradition? Does he protest against faults of some 
philosophical school? No, he merely shows that there is no last 
word, last commentary, the final reason -  but only another 
redescription in a sequence of earlier redescriptions, another 
reinterpretation in a sequence of earlier reinterpretations made by 
predecessors. To sum up, Rorty’s Derrida from this essay is a 
philosopher (or perhaps a metaphilosopher?) owing to the fact that 
he writes about philosophers; that he is engaged in a dialogue with 
Hegel, Husserl or Heidegger rather than, let us add, for instance, 
Cervantes, Rabelais, Sterne or Fielding. (The limit case of such 
view of philosophy is The Postcard, an almost "private" work which 
is undoubtedly philosophical, for is not the Socrates who writes app
philosophical problem? ). It seems to have taken Rorty almost a
21 Richard Rorty, CP, p. 96.
22 Let us listen to Derrida: "Have you seen this card, the image on the back
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decade to recontextualize the term "philosophy" in such a way that 
Derrida's work is entitled to be included there without further 
hesitation. It was already in this text written in 1977 that Rorty -  
although distancing himself from the "Continental" philosophy by 
loca ting  h im se lf w ith in  the "serious" trad ition  of the 
Anglo-American philosophical thinking -  saw the meaning and 
purpose in dealing with philosophers and not only philosophical 
claims, the sense of overcoming and surpassing one's 
predecessors, and not only solving inherited problems. This 
philosophical split into two traditions took place in Rorty's view after 
Kant, together with Hegel’s Phenomenology and it is present 
today, giving rise to two parallel "philosophies", linked only by the 
traditional, common name
To sum up: what reveals itself in Rorty is an interesting evolution 
in an approach to philosophy, its role and position in the world, as 
well as to a philosopher and his or her tasks. Apart from a publicly 
"committed" figure, a private philosopher (Rorty says: "I claim that 
ironist philosophers are private philosophers") whose work is 
"useless" to liberals "qua liberals", is born. Towards the end of the 
period of a metanarrative, also its "producer" (Lyotard) -  
philosopher in the traditional sense of the word -  comes into 
oblivion, into inexistence. This evolution in case of Richard Rorty 
could be shown in the form of the following catchwords, although 
explicitly they appeared only in its last stage, requiring a radical, 
dichotomous split: the public -  the public and the private -  the 
private. Rorty's course seems today to start from quite typical 
gradual leaving the "public" discourse (within which his object of 
criticism was Foucault, although when Derrida already glimmered 
somewhere as an interesting theme from the border line of 
philosophy and literature), through the acceptance of both types 
of philosophizing and equal justification of both spheres: the 23
of this card? ... I stopped dead, with a feeling of hallucination (is he crazy 
or what, he has the names mixed up!) and of revelation at the same time, an 
apocalyptic revelation: Socrates writing, writing in front of Plato, I always knew 
it, it had remained like the negative of a photograph to be developed for 
twenty-five centuries -  in me of course". The Post Card, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 9.
23 Richard Rorty, PP 2, p. 23.
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private and the public (just like in "The Case of Foucault"), to 
overtly  expressed in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
fascination with "private" and "self-creational" philosophizing of the 
late Derrida.
With one reservation though: Rorty himself seems not to follow 
an "ironist's" rules: it is not clear whether his sole aim is his own 
final vocabulary, his ideal is obviously not a "strong poet" (and 
Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence is extremely important 
among sources of Rorty’s discourse), he does not create his 
radically own, idiosyncratic language game, he moves within the 
domain of inherited questions and problems (though he writes 
about some of them that it might be better to "dissolve" them then 
"solve"); he argues with his opponents on the common ground 
instead of avoiding head-on fights and various tricks, and finally -  
there is much more of a "liberal" in him than of an "ironist", more 
of an advocate of solidarity than of self-creation... It seems an 
extremely interesting question what next Richard Rorty's step will 
be like: but not Rorty's as a person writing about philosophers 
(since this we know: long live Derrida!), but as a person who 
himself is a philosopher, who must himself struggle with 
incommensurability of private and public universes. Is it so that 
"philosophy has become more important for the pursuit of private 
perfection rather than for any social task"? And if it actually is 
the case, to what degree this statement would apply to its author? 
Will he also step into, or is just stepping into -  as it might be 
expected from the evolution shyly sketched here -  the private 
world of philosophical imagination, the world of phantastic -  since 
merely (?) self-creational -  projects? That is the question.
Postscript:
It is hard for me to resist the temptation to express my view 
about Richard Rorty’s response to an earlier version of that 
chapter presented during a conference in Toruri, Poland, devoted 
to his philosophy (1992) 24 5 I will try to give a brief "response to a
24 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 94.
25 Richard Rorty, "Response to Marek Kwiek", Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. L, no 
2/1993 (A response to a text "On Some Richard Rorty's Evolution", ibidem).
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response", for Rorty’s short remarks reveal still more, in my view, 
the significance of what I was writing about for the needs of the 
Rorty conference.
Let us begin in a textual (Rortyan?) manner. Rorty says the 
following right at the beginning: "there is one point at which he 
[Marek Kwiek] gets me wrong". What is it in Rorty’s vocabulary to 
"get somebody wrong" if there are no unambiguous authorial 
intentions, there is no unambiguous foundation of a text in a form 
of an unchangeable reading of it etc. etc. (of which Rorty writes so 
often)? Is it possible to "get somebody wrong" on the basis of the 
Rortyan set of redescriptive strategies and their assumptions? Is 
not it so that -  as Rorty himself wants, to stick to his works and his 
beliefs in readings of works in general -  what is at stake is saying 
something new, interesting (the word interesting, crucial to Rorty’s 
discourse, not accidentally is an object of criticism for 
con tem pora ry  Am erican ph ilosophe rs , like  the word 
conversation)? Surely, we are within a vicious circle of two different 
poles of irony; seriously speaking, I "got Rorty wrong", which is 
undoubtedly his right to reproach me for. Non-seriously speaking, 
using the other pole of irony, one could say, regardless of the 
circumstances, regardless of the questioned passage of 
argumentation and interpretation -  I made a "strong reading" of 
Rorty which he might have liked or not (for that is not a question 
of a rgum e n ta tio n ). If one w anted to s tick  to iron is t 
Rortyan-Bloomian recommendations, one could write almost 
everything about almost everything (and such are Rorty’s 
conclusions on numerous occasions). Therefore Rorty’s 
philosophizing is a double-edged style -  it allows to write about 
others but it somehow has to allow, on the very same basis, others’ 
writing about itself. Each redescription, each perspective, each 
horizon that potentially seems to be -  interesting, has to be 
allowed. And then, no matter what one writes, no matter how 
interesting or non-interesting it may sound, one cannot write, so it 
seems to me, that someone, like me in Rorty’s case, "got someone 
else wrong"... One seems doomed to reading convincing visions, 
investigating their persuasive power, and either praise or deplore 
on the same basis. That is the remark on one sentence.
Let us listen to Rorty from Toruń, from his response to me:
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The issue Kwiek raises is whether I have to "struggle with 
the incommensurability of private and public universes".
But incommensurability is not, in itself, an occasion for 
struggle. My delight in listening to Mozart is, in the 
relevant sense, incommensurable with my delight in 
catching fish- that is to say, there is no way to talk about 
both at once, to compare their respective advantages 
and disadvantages by reference to a single set of 
preferences or standards. But that does not mean there 
is a struggle between the two alternative occupations. 
There is only the same struggle as arises when there are 
conflicting dinner invitations -  one cannot do both at the 
same time.
The answer is a playful one, to an extent, but it does not touch 
on what I attempted to write about, nor on what may turn out to be 
important and what Rorty cannot, and is not willing to, see from 
his perspective. Rorty says that he does not have to struggle with 
the private/public choice. The example he gives is defective, for 
both "listening to Mozart" and "catching fish" do not go beyond the 
private sphere. Rorty’s example can be linked only to a choice 
made within the private sphere, as each choice is between 
different pastimes which always (at least in their socially accepted 
forms) remain in the private sphere. The choice I meant and the 
incommensurability I was writing about, cannot be reduced to 
banal examples from the life of the so-called everyman, for the 
everyman in question does not write and does not have any 
influence on the public sphere generally in all days except those 
of democratic elections. The philosopher, on the other hand, 
writes, and it is perhaps by the very act of writing (or rather 
publishing what he writes), that he enters the public sphere, 
whether he wishes this or not. The "public sphere" I meant, 
however, was still something else; I mean, obviously, the choice 
how, about what, what for and for whom one engages in 
philosophy. The issue is relatively simple in the case of poetry 
(except e.g. French surrealism in which Lenin and Rimbaud or 
Lautréamont formed two direct and simultaneous impulses) -  one 
writes for oneself, it is less clear in the case of the novel, literary
102 The question of self-creation
criticism, essays, and totally unclear -  today -  in the case of 
philosophy. And I meant that ambiguity.
To be sure, I do not mean the choice (born out of 
incommensurability) between the private and the public based on 
nonhistorical and nonindividual criteria, on a noncontingent set of 
preferences. The choice is a totally individual one, and by any 
means as simple as the one between two conflicting dinner 
invitations. The choice requires determination -fo rthe  very person 
engaged in it -  what is or might be philosophy and practising 
ph ilosophy . One can choose betw een the pastim es 
aforementioned by Rorty, catch fish for three days and listen to 
Mozart for another four (and reverse the proportion the following 
week). It is difficult, however, and I would like to defend the view, 
not to choose between two kinds of philosophy one wants to 
engage in, be it only in the nearest period of time. Can one be a 
p ragm a tic  soc ia l eng ineer on M ondays and an 
ironist/self-creator/poet on Fridays? Cannot one speak here of 
some struggles and some incommensurability? Is not there a 
place for a struggle -  between committment (which we knew in 
abundance from history, especially of French intellectuals in the 
twentieth century) and social indifference (no less known there and 
elsewhere), not on the level of theory and with the help of existing 
models of conduct but on that of an individual choice which makes 
one thinker (at least for some time) a philosophical commissar and 
another a philosophical poet. The fact that Rorty does not accept 
the moment of the possibility of choice does not testify to the fact 
that there is no such choice. We are writing in the present book 
that philosophers of the past and of the present are located by 
Rorty on a private/public chessboard, that they are, generally, 
either private or public, either liberal or ironist. Perhaps the only 
liberal ironist one can think of at the moment is Rorty himself. 
Surprisingly enough, he seems unable or unwilling to show anyone 
else suitable for this mixed private and public place he occupies. 
All others can be characterized with the Kierkegaardian "purity of 
heart" -  willing one thing -  which requires to desire one thing with 
the exception of all other; all dead and living philosophers are 
immersed in this "religious desire for single-mindedness" from the 
response given to me. Perhaps the situation of a philosopher who
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does not have to choose -  at some point in his life -  from among 
Rorty’s dichotomies is a utopian one (and therefore the only 
exemplification of it is Rorty as he sees himself)?
Rorty simplifies and makes a caricature of the problem when 
he writes that the choice separated by me is the following: "at every 
moment of one’s life, there is one and only one right thing to be 
doing". Rather, at most moments of our lives there are such things 
to do that are connected with our earlier choices. "If one is a 
philosopher -  the author goes on ironically -  there is one and only 
one sort of thing that one ought to be doing with one’s tim e"26 
There are many things one can be doing with one’s philosophical 
time, but I do not think that no choice is necessary; the choice was 
also made by Rorty himself when he gave priority to democracy 
rather than to philosophy, to liberalism  rather than to 
totalitarianism, to public philosophy (in his own case) rather than 
private philosophy (praised in the case of others). Let me ask once 
again whether he is stepping in the private world of philosophical 
imagination, the world of phantastic -  since merely (?) 
self-creational -  projects? I do not think so, at least this cannot be 
found in his works -  more public, to use his distinction to himself.
26 Richard Rorty, "Response to Marek Kwiek", p. 199.
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